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INTRODUCTION
The traditional public remedies  to reduce  or avoid groundwater
contamination by agricultural chemicals have been education, regulation, or
subsidies.  Little  attention has been paid to public purchase of less-than-fee
rights other than development rights or  full cropping rights.  In this paper
we explore the implications of a hypothetical public program designed to
eliminate certain agricultural chemicals  from groundwater recharge areas
through the purchase  of chemical use rights.  Using a farm-level model, we
examine the  opportunity costs of a landowner selling to  the government  the
rights  to use atrazine and/or alachlor  in corn.  We then consider the
administrative and financial dimensions  of such a scheme.
Consider an aquifer actually or potentially contaminated by agricultural
chemicals.  Several courses  of action are open to the government.  One  is  to
"educate" farmers on the errors  of their ways and convince  them to change
practices.  Farmers might bear all the costs of such voluntary measures,  or
the government might partially defray the costs.  This  is  the approach of the
traditional cost-share programs  in soil conservation,  for example.
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comments and criticisms.A second course of action is  for the government to  impose a tax  (or
offer a subsidy)  on farm chemicals,  in an attempt to better match private with
social marginal costs.  This is  the recommendation of many economic studies,
but practical applications have been limited.  Pricing schemes may be
ineffective  in dealing with many non-point agricultural problems for two
reasons:  (1) it  is hard to target among a heterogeneous population, and (2)
input demand elasticities are  so  low that taxes must be very high to
significantly affect application rates.  Neither drawback  is necessarily
fatal, but they appear to have kept most public  initiatives from this  course.
Many existing agricultural chemical taxes,  for  example, serve more as  revenue
sources than they do as  input  constrictors.
A third action option is  regulation.  Certain farming practices can be
mandated (so-called best management practices,  BMPs,  for example)  or certain
inputs can be restricted by law  (a regional ban on certain pesticides,  for
example).  Phillips et al.  (1989)  and Knutson et al.  (1990) provide recent
examples at the national level.  Regulation imposes unreimbursed costs on
producers, possibly up to  a point where courts determine that a taking has
occurred,  for which compensation may be required.
In none  of these three categories has an explicit transfer of property
rights  occurred, although each can be and has been evaluated in a rights
framework.  A fourth option is  the direct purchase of limited property rights.
LIMITED RIGHTS ACQUISITION
The task is how,  in a market society with relatively unimpeded private
property rights  in land,  to get landowners  to act so  as  to maximize societal
benefits.  Some economists  argue that this will  ipso facto be accomplished by
privatizing all rights and allowing free exchange.  Taylor  (1975),  for
2example,  shows certain advantages  (vis a vis an excise tax) for a market
trading scheme for fertilizer rights.  Other analysts contend that only
regulation will alter  landowner behavior in appropriate directions, because
public goods and transactions costs will always  cause property market outcomes
to  deviate from societal optima.
A possible middle ground is  sought by those who focus on the mix of
rights and obligations between public and private sectors.  If landowners'
behavior causes problems,  the argument goes,  then the public should acquire
(either through condemnation or voluntary sale) just those rights whose
exercise causes  the problem.
A formal limited rights  transfer has  at least three main justifications.
First,  it  avoids possible  legal challenges  to  a regulatory scheme that only
implicitly transfers the  rights.  Second,  it is presumed to be cheaper than
buying full fee  title.  Third, we know how to do it.  State transportation
departments have many years' experience  in buying scenic easements;  state and
federal agencies have long acquired wetland easements and leases;  and, more
recently, administrators of the  federal  Conservation Reserve Program and of
some state programs  (such as  Minnesota's RIM Reserve) have learned how to buy
cropping rights both for stated periods and in perpetuity.
Limited rights acquisition for environmental purposes  is not without its
problems.  First, some might argue that farmers  don't have the rights  to  sell
in the first place.  The  "right"--or, more precisely,  the lack of liability--
to pollute public water supplies  is  generally not felt to be fairly in the
hands of farmers.  On the other hand,  in many cases landowners'  actions that
result  in pollution are perfectly legitimate under the existing legal
framework.  For example,  in some states farmers have been declared largely
3free of liability for any groundwater contamination that might result from
agricultural chemicals applied according to  label directions.
A second problem with limited rights'  transfers  is one of administration
and enforcement.  It costs money to appraise  (or bid out) potential
acquisitions,  and it costs money to ensure that farmers no longer engage  in
practices that are now constrained.  Enforcement costs may vary with the  type
of right acquired.  It may be cheaper to monitor whether or not a farmer  is in
violation of a transfer of the right to  grow corn,  say,  than it  is  to monitor
the  right to use  atrazine on corn.  Cheaper acquisition costs in many
instances may be offset by more expensive monitoring costs.  We discuss this
further in a later section.
Ultimately, a limited rights  transfer scheme might be justified by
simple expediency.  It may be more cost-effective--and more  timely--to
purchase  the appropriate set of rights from the  appropriate set of landowners
(if they can be identified) than to bear the  expense of legal and technical
complexities attributable to  regulatory approach.  Which will it be,  a "fair"
settlement that might not come about for years,  or an "unfair" settlement  that
might increase public benefits dramatically,  starting tomorrow?  Given such
circumstances, some public bodies have opted for the second approach.
It  is  to  a particular agricultural property rights acquisition scheme
that we now turn.  How might a scheme be set up to buy chemical use rights
from farmers in order to reduce groundwater  contamination?  In the next
section we show that the costs of such rights' purchases might be low enough
to provide substantial cost savings,  if  the  goal of  the purchase is  simply to
reduce  farm chemical use.
4MEASURING FARM CHEMICAL USE EASEMENT COSTS
Many public property rights  acquisition programs use some sort of
parcel-by-parcel appraisal to determine easement values.  This  is  true whether
the easement is  purchased (as it  is  in most public programs)  or donated for
tax purposes  (as  it  is  in many private  transactions  (Diehl and Barrett,
1988)).  The CRP, RIM and Water Bank programs,  on the other hand, essentially
make take-it-or-leave-it offers  tied to  some fixed percentage of prevailing
cash rental rates or local  estimated land market values.  (Technically, land
is  enrolled into the CRP based on farmer bids;  in actuality, nearly all bids
are  at the county maximum acceptable  rental rate,  an administratively
determined price  (Young and Osborn,  1990).)
A few programs  tie  easement prices  to farmer opportunity costs,
calculated for a region and offered to  landowners on take-it-or-leave-it basis
(see Buckland, 1987,  and Anderson et al.,  1988,  for examples).  The  scheme
explored in this paper  is  in this vein.  We  calculate the opportunity cost for
a representative farm of transferring to  the  government the rights to use
atrazine and/or alachlor on corn.  This becomes  the cost of the chemical use
easement.  We do not attempt to show the distributions of such opportunity
costs  in a geographic area;  hence, we cannot determine the participation rate
if a voluntary rights acquisition scheme were  to be pegged to the rates
estimated here.
The important values for our purposes are the farmer's opportunity
costs of transfer and society's net benefits  from such a transfer.  Presumably
the latter outweighs  the  former, although this  is  rarely verified in practice.
Just because a limited property right is  cheaper then fee-simple doesn't mean
that the societal net account  is necessarily positive as a result of transfer.
For example, Kozloff (1989) shows  the possibility of negative net present
5value societal benefits  for CRP enrollment in a case-study watershed.  Nor is
it necessarily the case that societal gain is positive  if the cost of easement
acquisition (through direct payment or  through tax forgiveness)  is  lower than
the appraised value of the easement.  Market values for either full or partial
titles do not reflect  societal benefits  from acquisition unless several rather
strong assumptions hold.
In this paper we follow the traditional  approach of assuming that
societal benefits  from rights acquisition have somehow been determined to
exceed both the private and the  social costs of acquisition.  We look to
private opportunity costs  to  estimate  the prices necessary to  effect the
rights  transfer itself.
Our specific task is  to estimate how much it would cost  the government
to buy,  alternatively, a farmer's rights  to  use atrazine, atrazine and
alachlor, or all chemical herbicides on corn.  The two chemicals are by far
the most common pesticide contaminants of upper midwest groundwater  (Hallberg,
1989),  and both are extremely important in contemporary corn production
(Becker et al.,  1988).  Atrazine, which controls broadleaf weeds,  appears to
leach faster, while alachlor, which controls  grasses,  may be a more serious
health threat in equal quantities  in the water supply.  For present purposes,
we assume  that neither is desirable:  the  goal  is  to cost-effectively reduce
their use in sensitive groundwater areas.
Our approach is to invert the results  of a previous examination of the
farm level costs of an outright ban on the use of certain farm chemicals  (Cox,
1989;  Cox and Easter,  1990).  If enforcement costs are assumed equal  (they
probably are not equal, but it  is difficult to  determine which is larger  in
the absence of practical experience),  then opportunity costs imposed upon a
farmer by a ban ought to be equivalent to the necessary payment by the
6government to the farmer to forego all use  of the affected chemical  or
chemicals.  Proffered payments below this reservation price will not result in
a rights  transfer.
Any weed control system can be thought of as  a pair of weather-related
yield response  functions, one representing the  response to  a particular weed
control practice  (chemical,  if any, plus  appropriate tillage)  if the weather
is  "good" for that practice, the other representing the response  in bad
weather.  A given expenditure on weed control results in lower yields  if  the
weather is bad, and larger expenditures  on weed control would have been
required if the weather turns out bad in order to achieve  the same yield as  in
good weather.  Thus,  the difference between good weather and bad weather
yields represents  the "yield risk"  associated with a particular weed control
practice at a particular level of expenditure.  Similarly,  the difference in
expenditures necessary to achieve the  same yield represents  the  "cost risk"
associated with weather extremes.  Different weed control practices have
different associated good and bad weather probabilities, the ramifications of
which will be discussed in more detail later.
One  can imagine many different pairs of production response  functions,
each associated with a unique weed control practice.  The relative magnitudes
of cost and yield shifts are assumed known to the producer.  All inputs except
those relating to weed control are held fixed,  so the response  function ties
weed control expenditures  (including tillage)  to yield.
The effect of a change in herbicide use  due to a chemical use rights
transfer  is  to shift to a new production response pair that represents an
alternative practice  that is  less effective  (with respect  to yield),  more
expensive,  or both.  Empirically,  the model requires estimation of three
links:  that between weather and the effectiveness of given weed control
7practices  (herbicide use,  tillage practices),  that between weed control
practices  and weed density in the  field,  and that between weed density and
crop yield.  Available data,  however, permits only a glossing of these
relationships.  The weed control literature  allows us  to estimate  crop yield
in those weather conditions  that are either good or bad, for a given level  of
.weed control expenditure.  The response functions  can be evaluated at each of
these two points, but not at any intermediate points.
While certain farming practices are  in reality reversible  (e.g.,  more
cultivating if a broadcast herbicide fails),  the decisions modeled here are
treated as  irreversible.  Once a chemical or management practice has been
selected from the  set of available options,  it  is used, and predicted yields
result, given the weather.  No  further changes are possible.  The purchase of
a chemical use right and the attendant switch to a new weed control regime
increases potential risks in two dimensions.  The new regime may expose the
farmer to a change  in the probability that something bad will happen (weather,
in our case, because  the new practice has a different probability of failure),
and  it may  increase the loss  associated with adverse occurrences  (yield
reductions  in bad weather.)
A cost function was estimated by constructing representative farm
enterprise budgets using alternative weed control treatments.  The model
permits examination of different tillage systems, but only reduced tillage
(chisel plow rather than moldboard plow) is  reported here.  Costs and return
data are from southeastern Minnesota farm records and crop budgets.  A full
account of the construction of the representative farm and enterprise budgets
can be found in Cox  (1989).  This approach permits us  to explore three
different producer decision rules  ("optimizing paradigms"),  depending on how
each would adjust operations following sale of chemical use  rights:
81)  Minimize yield risks.  The producer tries to maintain the same
yields in both good and bad weather as  were obtained before
selling the use rights.  Any extra cost of required weed control
shows up in reduced net returns.
2)  Minimize revenue losses.  The producer tries  to  maximize returns
if the weather should be bad.  (This  is similar to some  "safety
first" paradigms.)
3)  Maximize profits.  The producer tries  to maximize  expected net
returns,  given the  (known) yield associated with any weed control
option in both good and bad weather.
These  decision rules are used to define each farmer's  appropriate
choices  following sale of various use rights  to  the government.  The  farmer
must trade off yield and cost changes against the easement payment when forced
to  choose an alternative.  The magnitude of the effects on any particular
producer depends in part on which decision rule  is used to choose  a weed
control  substitute.  We apply a returns-over-operating cost  ("net returns,"
"profit") measure for easement valuation.  Corn sells  for $2.43,  the  local  10-
year deflated (1987)  season average price.  The  total weed-control choice  set
is  itemized  in Cox (1989).
RESULTS
In the pre-transfer distribution of use rights,  a pre-emergent
application of atrazine and alachlor is  the optimal choice for the  300 acre
representative farm, regardless  of which farmer decision rule prevails  (Table
1).  This practice also results in the smallest yield reduction,  at a given
weed control level,  from adverse weather conditions.  Table 2 summarizes the
optimal  (for each decision rule) weed control practice remaining after rights
9to,  successively,  atrazine,  atrazine plus alachlor, and all herbicides are
sold at the government-determined easement price.  Tables 3-6  trace the
implications of these selections  on yield, operating costs,  and net returns.
If only the right to use  atrazine is  sold,  farmers employing each rule
select cyanazine and an additional  cultivation as a replacement.  If all
herbicide rights are sold,  the only practice remaining in the weed control
choice set  is a rotary hoe with three cultivations.
The atrazine plus alachlor rights bundle is more interesting.  Farmers
seeking to maintain yields substitute metalachlor for alachlor and cyanazine
for atrazine as well  as  add a second cultivation.  So do  loss minimizers,  even
though their weighted average net returns  reduction  (Table 6) is  thereby
greater than if they had chosen, as  do  profit maximizers,  to go  instead to  the
rotary hoe combination.  We see  the reason why in Table  5.  The loss  in
returns  in bad weather for  the metolachlor combination is only $9.52,  while
that for  the rotary hoe combination is  $73.27.  Loss minimizers look only at
bad weather returns,  not the  expected returns shown in Table 6.
Cost of Rights
Consider the  sale of only the right to use atrazine.  The  $7.72 per acre
per year reduction in net returns under each of the  three decision rules
(Table 6) is  due solely to  the increased cost of the substitute herbicide and
the  increased tillage costs  (Table 4):  there  is  no change  in yield, whatever
the weather  (Table 3).
Next,  consider the  sale of the rights  to use  either atrazine or
alachlor.  Once again,  producers that try to maintain yields experience  the
same losses as those that try to minimize bad weather losses, because they
choose the same weed control alternative,  although for different reasons.
10Their reduced returns are due solely to  increased cost, as yields are
maintained in both weather states,  and the probability of adverse weather is
unchanged  (Table 2).
An expected profits maximizer in this  situation will instead shift to  a
weed control regime using no herbicides,  even though only atrazine  and
alachlor rights have been transferred.  Table 6 seems  to suggest  that a
government employing an expected net returns metric could buy the rights  to
use all  chemicals at a lower price than that for just the rights  to use
atrazine and alachlor  (for the yield maintenance and loss minimization
decision rules).  This would not be the  case, however.  Farmers using these
two decision rules  do not choose alternatives  on the basis of expected
returns;  rather,  the yield maintainer looks at yields alone  (Table  3),  and  the
loss minimizer looks at returns  in bad weather alone  (Table  5).  If the
government were to offer either of these  farmers  the $8.83  payment for all
chemical  rights suggested in Table 6, both are likely to balk, because net
returns  does not approximate their opportunity costs.  Especially for  the loss
minimizer,  some sort of risk premium subsidy might be required.  No attempt is
made here  to estimate the magnitude of such a surcharge.
11TABLE  1:  Optimal Weed Control Practices:  Base Conditions, All Decision Rules
Yields  (Net Returns)
Operating  Ave.  Net
Practice  Cost/acre  Returns  Good Weather  Bad Weather
atrazine + alachlor  116.31  254.17  165  (284.64)  132  (204.45)
TABLE 2:  Optimal Weed Control Alternative After Chemical Use Rights Transfers
(Probability of bad weather)
Rights Acquired
Decision  Atrazine plus
Rule  Atrazine  Alachlor  All Herbicides
Maintain  cyanazine + alachlor  metolachlor +  rotary hoe +
Yields  + 2 cultivations  cyanazine +  3 cultivations
(0.38)  2 cultivations  (0.19)
(0.38)
Minimize  cyanazine + alachlor  metolachlor +  rotary hoe +
Loss  + 2 cultivations  cyanazine +  3 cultivations
(0.38)  2 cultivations  (0.19)
(0.38)
Maximize  cyanazine + alachlor  rotary hoe +  rotary hoe +
Profit  + 2 cultivations  3 cultivations  3 cultivations
(0.38)  (0.19)  (0.19)
12TABLE  3:  Annual Per-Acre Yields After Chemical Use Rights Transfer
(Reduction from base  case)
Rights Acquired
Atrazine plus
Atrazine  Alachlor  All Herbicides
Weather:  Good  Bad  Good  Bad  Good  Bad
Decision
Rule
Maintain  165  132  165  132  157  99
Yields  0  0  0  0  8  33
Minimize  165  132  165  132  157  99
Loss  0  0  0  0  8  33
Maximize  165  132  157  99  157  99
Profit  0  0  8  33  8  33
TABLE  4:  Annual Per-Acre Operating Costs after Chemical Use Rights  Transfer
(Increase from base  case)
Rights  Acquired
Atrazine plus
Atrazine  Alachlor  All Herbicides
Decision Rule
Maintain  124.03  125.83  109.39
Yeilds  7.72  9.52  -6.92
Minimize  124.03  125.83  109.39
Loss  7.72  9.52  -6.92
Maximize  124.03  109.39  109.39
Profit  7.72  -6.92  -6.92
13TABLE 5:  Annual Per-Acre Net Returns After Chemical Use Rights  Transfer
(Reduction from base case)
Rights Acquired
Atrazine plus
Atrazine  Alachlor  All Herbicides
Weather:  Good  Bad  Good  Bad  Good  Bad
Decision
Rule
Maintain  276.92  196.73  275.12  194.93  272.12  131.18
Yields  7.72  7.72  9.52  9.52  12.52  73.27
Minimize  276.92  196.73  275.12  194.93  272.12  131.18
Loss  7.72  7.72  9.52  9.52  12.52  73.27
Maximize  276.92  196.73  272.12  131.18  272.12  131.18
Profit  7.72  7.72  12.52  73.27  12.52  73.27
TABLE  6:  Annual Per-Acre Weighted Average Net Returns after Chemical Use Rights
Transfer  (Reduction from base case)
Rights Acquired
Atrazine plus
Atrazine  Alachlor  All Herbicides
Decision
Rule
Maintain  246.45  244.65  245.34
Yields  7.72  9.52  8.83
Minimize  246.45  244.65  245.34
Loss  7.72  9.52  8.83
Maximize  246.45  245.34  245.34
Profit  7.72  8.83  8.83
14If the purchased rights are  to be permanent,  a one-time payment might
reasonably be  set at the present value of the reduction in annual weighted
average net returns shown in Table  6.  In Table 7 we present the range of one-
time payments associated with a 7% (11% nominal  interest, 4% inflation
assumed) capitalization rate.  By way of comparison,  estimated adjusted sales
values for farms of this type  in the study region averaged $938  per acre  in
1989  (Govindan and Raup, 1990).  Average  CRP rental rates  in the area have run
just under $70  (Taff, 1989) per acre per year, which corresponds to  a one-time
payment of $1,000  per acre for a permanent contract at the  same 7%
capitalization rate.
The permanent rights payments estimated in Table 7 would therefore be on
the order of  10-15% of local land values.  If a use-rights scheme  turns out  to
be administratively practical,  then,  it would clearly cost considerably less
than a full cropping rights  scheme or a full purchase program.
TABLE 7:  Permanent Per-Acre Chemical Use Rights Acquisition Costs
Rights Acquired
Atrazine  All
Decision Rule  Atrazine  + Alachlor  Herbicides
Maintain  110  136  126
Yields
Minimize  110  136  126
Loss
Maximize  110  104  126
Profit
15DISCUSSION
Prior  to  turning to questions of administration,  three points  about the
price generation mechanism require elaboration.  Most weed control practices
perform similarly if the weather turns out to be favorable for weed control.
(Recall that any given weather pattern may be good for one regime but bad for
another.)  It is performance when the weather is unfavorable that
distinguishes one practice  from another.  The major effect of rights transfers
analyzed here,  then,  is  to  increase yield risk when the weather is bad and/or
to change  the overall costs  of weed control.  A  producer who can get into the
fields at  the appropriate time  can successfully substitute mechanical  for
chemical weed control.  When there  is adequate  rainfall to move herbicides
into  the  soil before weeds germinate,  the substitution of one herbicide for
another has  little effect on yield.  However,  if  the weather is unfavorable,
some herbicides perform much better than others.  It is under these conditions
that the  transfer of one  or more  chemical use  rights  is most clearly felt by
producers.
Second,  the most important factor affecting the magnitude of easement
costs  is  the effect of selected substitutes on yield.  Production cost
increases are dwarfed by even small losses  in per-acre yields.  Surprisingly,
the technical information available  to  estimate such yield losses  is poor.
Most agronomic studies have focused on the relative performance  of one
herbicide compared to another,  as measured by relative weed control.  Much
more research focusing on the effect of weed density on yield and on the
relative performance of alternative weed control regimes on yield is needed.
Third,  the more flexible the  farmer's response  to weed infestation
and the more varied the choice set after use-right transfers,  the smaller is
the  opportunity cost of the  transfer.  Producers who can change  their
16rotations and cropping patterns can substantially mitigate the loss of the
right to use a particular herbicide.  Additionally,  a producer prepared to
make split applications of grass and broadleaf herbicides and prepared to make
timely substitutions of mechanical for chemical weed control if the weather
should reduce  the effectiveness of any particular herbicide,  could mitigate
the  loss of any particular herbicide from the choice set.  Modeling this kind
of flexible response requires more detailed information about the relationship
between weather, weed control, and yield than is  available presently.
Since the representative  farm is  constrained to  simple substitutions of
herbicides and tillage, and since  the weed control and yield model tends  to
overestimate losses  in bad weather, the  easement values reported here should
be considered high end.
EXTENSIONS
We have shown that a chemical rights  purchase scheme might offer
sizeable budget savings over existing cropping rights'  schemes.  How might
such a program be implemented?  Several aspects of a functioning program need
to be addressed.
What to pay?
The price determination scheme used here used the opportunity costs  to a
representative farm of the optimal alternatives  to various chemical use rights
packages.  There  is  no  reason to expect that other farms on other soils would
exhibit  the  same prices  (or even the  same ranking)  for the  same packages.
(This problem is  shared with any program administered over heterogeneous
entities.)
17A program administrator would have at  least three options.  (1)
Establish the same  "reasonable" rate for all  farmers in a given geographic
area.  Some farmers would be offered more  than their opportunity costs, while
some farmers would be offered less and so,  presumably, would not sell their
rights.  (2) Calculate a set of reservation prices for each farm unit in the
program area.  This  is likely to  entail substantial  information costs, but
other research  (Kozloff, 1990)  suggests that a program employing such
information may be more cost effective than one  that does not.  (3) Find some
surrogate reservation price indicator that  is  less  expensive  to  calculate but
that still accurately differentiates among units.  For present purposes, a
candidate  indicator might be inherent soil productivity, although  it  is
unclear that the  link is  as  clear as  one would like.  If farmers more
intensively manage higher productivity soils,  then reliance upon chemicals  for
such soils  is  likely greater.  But  it could instead be the case  that low
productivity soils need herbicides even more  in order to maintain production.
In that case,  the relationship is reversed.
None of these approaches help with the problem of determining which
optimization framework (in the  sense used here) each farmer employs.  They
also  do not address the question of which farmers  to select  if only some
subset is  to  participate,  due to budget constraints or whatever.  As we showed
earlier,  a simple expected net returns metric would underpay two  of the
decision types if the rights to all herbicides were sought.
A chemical rights purchase program that avoids most (but not all) of the
perverse incentives, high information costs, and recurring high administrative
costs,  might be one that pays at a level  determined by individual  farmer bids.
Bidding schemes presumably reduce public information acquisition costs,  since
18each bid encapsulates  individual opportunity costs,  discount rates,  risk
preferences,  and expectations.
While bidding schemes designed to  increase cost effectiveness  in the
public purchase  of environmentally desirable property rights are complex both
in theory and in practice  (Kozloff and Taff,  1990),  they possess certain
attractive characteristics  for the present situation.  The illustration showed
the sensitivity of the opportunity cost estimates to the underlying
assumptions regarding landowner decision rules,  as well as  assumptions about
prices  and available chemical alternatives.  Bidding may obviate the need to
make such assumptions.
A bidding scheme might also obviate  the need for targeting the rights
acquisition to  any particular fields or farms, because most such schemes
implicitly assume homogeneity in potential damages across farms with the  same
reservation price.  (However,  the same  reservation price may result from quite
different farm operations  on quite different soils.)  This  is an assumption
shared by any scheme that selects from a target population on some basis other
than on program objectives.  In our case,  if the  goal  is  to reduce
contamination from agricultural chemicals,  selection on the basis of an
ordering of bids does not guarantee cost-effective pollution reduction, unless
bid levels are perfectly  (and negatively) correlated with pollution
contribution or unless all farmers pollute equally.
Which Rights?
We address  in this paper the purchase of the rights  to use known,
already-used chemicals,  in various packages.  The  scheme is  to buy only those
rights that matter, at which point farmers would employ instead other
(presumably more environmentally benign)  chemicals or alternative management
19practices.  But what if the selected alternatives are at some later date
themselves determined to be environmentally damaging?  Would the government
have to now purchase  the rights to  this next set of chemicals?  This further
constraining of  the producer's choice set would presumably add to  the cost of
the original purchases.  The problem is  confounded by the possibility of new
and deleterious  chemicals coming on line.  Either the government would have to
buy the right to potentially use a new chemical,  or  it would have  to  require
that farmers show they are using the chemical before the right could be
purchased.  The  latter arrangement would introduce a considerable moral hazard
element,  since farmers would have the  incentive  to use a damaging chemical in
order to  get the government  to buy that right.
Partial approaches  to  this problem might include buying the  rights  to
families  of chemicals  (such as  the  triazines),  buying the rights to  use all
chemicals  (which we explore in this paper),  or buying the rights to  use all
chemicals declared hazardous, now or  later,  as  designated on a list to be
continually updated.  The latter approach would help skirt the moral hazard
issue,  but would complicate  the  determination of the  appropriate purchase
price, since a sizeable new stochastic element would have been introduced.
Monitoring and Enforcement
Any time that specific chemical  rights--as against use of all chemicals-
-are acquired, monitoring costs are probably high.  One procedure might be  to
check sales manifests through input  suppliers.  Strong penalties might have  to
be levied against  suppliers who knowingly sell non-permitted chemicals to
farmers with restrictive easements.  To avoid unrestricted farmers buying
chemicals  and in turn selling to farmers with easements, the government might
require  that suppliers apply all chemicals,  so  that non-permitted chemicals
are not put on lands with easements.  Another route might be to  periodically
20test soils on restricted fields;  any finding of non-permitted chemicals would
be automatically a violation of the terms  of easement.
The monitoring issue exhibits elements of the assurance problem.  Even
if farmers stop using the chemicals and even if agency monitoring is  fail-
safe,  the public may not believe that chemical use  rights purchases are
effective.  Expenditures necessary to convince people of the environmental
efficacy of the scheme may outweigh any cost savings associated with the
reduced rights' purchases.
When to pay?
We have discussed thus  far  an annual payment for specific chemical
rights.  Placing such a system into  a multi-year framework raises new problems
and possibilities.  If atrazine,  say,  causes problems now, it will presumably
cause problems at any  future date of use.  The discounted sum of annual
payments shown in Table  7 suggests itself as  a one-time payment for a
perpetual atrazine  easement.  (This  is  the approach taken to  secure permanent
easements  for all cropping rights enrolled into Minnesota's RIM Reserve  (Taff
and Lee,  1990).)
But  is  it reasonable to pay for perpetual use rights to  chemicals that
might not be used after a few years as newer,  cheaper alternative chemicals
are introduced,  or as chemicals are subjected to wider safety restrictions,
obviating the need for a purchase of a chemical easement?  A mid-range
alternative is  to purchase  the chemical  right for some set period--five years,
say.  At the end of  the period,  the easement might be repurchased  (if the
chemical  still is  on the active list) or allowed to lapse  (if the chemical is
no longer used, whether because of a subsequent restriction or because newer
chemicals have replaced it).  A limited-term easement of this  sort might also
21serve as  the "transition payment" demanded by sustainable agriculture
interests, a guarantee of partial income while farmers convert to  different
(presumably lower chemical  intensive) cropping practices.
It isn't clear how these rights might be priced.  The purchase of use
rights  that might never be exercised seems complicated by possibly perverse
incentives.  Should the value be tied to  the present opportunity costs of
moving from unrestricted to restricted production, or from some estimate of
potential  opportunity costs?  Dealing with the moral hazard problem by paying
a uniform rate--uniform in that all farmers are treated as  if  they were,  say,
profit maximizers--opens up associated adverse selection difficulties.  Paying
only the profit maximizing rate for atrazine plus alachlor rights,  in our
example, would preclude entry by the  other two types  of farmers,  who base weed
control  decisions on something other than expected net returns.
Aggregate Effects
Three  aggregate aspects of a chemical use rights  acquisition program
merit elaboration:  the first is environmental,  the second is  commodity
production, and the third is  input  industry reaction.  As Table  2 shows,  the
selected alternative weed control practice depends on both the use  right sold
to  the government and the  farmer's decision rule.  The aggregate environmental
effects of the easement purchase program,  then, depend in part upon the
distribution of farmer decision types within an area  (if all farmers sell
easements to  the government)  or upon the decision rules  of those farmers that
actually participate in the purchase program.  The aggregate environmental
effects could also vary with the  type of payment scheme employed, even
abstracting from moral hazard problems discussed above.  Each of the different
selected optimal--and still  legal--weed control practices presumably have
different environmental implications.  For example,  if  the predominant sign-up
22for atrazine plus  alachlor easements  is from among profit maximizing farmers
(those who would thereby switch to  a no-chemical regime),  resultant soil
erosion levels might be different from those expected if most of the sellers
were  loss minimizers  (those who  switch to another chemical and don't increase
tillage as much).
For the  same reasons,  commodity production effects will likewise depend
upon the use-right acquired,  the distribution of farmers  types, and the
payment scheme effected.  As Table 3 shows,  different yields result from the
various optimal alternative weed control practices selected by each farmer
type.  If the predominant optimizing paradigm is yield maintenance,  for
example,  only a complete chemical rights purchase scheme can be  expected to
affect regional output levels.
How might companies that sell weed control chemicals react  to  the onset
of a rights purchase program of  the sort envisioned here?  The loss  of an
established market can be expected to  evoke some sort of response if rights
sales to  the government become significant.  After all,  only the farmer's
opportunity costs are covered by the purchase price.  If the  same company
sells  the selected alternative chemical (metolachlor in the  case of an
alachlor rights purchase,  for example),  then the company may be no worse off
(and may be even better off if metolachlor commands a higher price).
If, however,  the company faces  a significant  loss  in revenues,  either
because it does not market the selected alternative or because many farmers
end up selling all chemical use rights  to  the governemnt, more dramatic legal
or pricing actions might be  expected.  The company might challenge the
legality of the purchase program itself, arguing that the government purchases
have  in some way infringed upon a "right" the company itself enjoys,  the right
to sell a perfectly legal  (although socially damaging) chemical.  Or  the
23company might lower the price of metolachlor, in our example,  sufficiently to
offset any financial incentive that  the  farmer has to  sell more than atrazine
plus alachlor rights at a government rights payment price based on presumed
higher alternative chemical prices.  Whatever  the case,  the chemical rights
purchase  scheme  discussed here would almost certainly not be revenue neutral
for the  input industry as a whole.
SUMMARY
We have shown that an easement program that purchases a farmer's  rights
to  use certain agricultural chemicals  is  conceptually feasible and possibly
even socially desirable,  abstracting from enforcement costs.  Acquisition
costs are  shown to be considerably lower than those  for full cropping rights
programs like the CRP.  But the practical efficacy of a chemical rights
purchase program is placed seriously  in question by problems  in administration
and the establishment of perverse incentives once product innovation is
considered.  These are perhaps not insoluble problems, but they do  suggest the
need to more thoroughly examine potential administrative costs  (enforcement,
monitoring, record keeping) before embarking upon a test of the  system.  A
system of specific crop rights acquisition would seem at first glance  to be
far less  costly to administer, although the costs  of the  crop rights
themselves would likely be greater than those chemical use  rights examined
here.
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